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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent investment arbitration cases have issued split decisions on a subtle yet consequential issue: the nature of the rights of investors under investment treaties. And the split extends not only to the outcome of the cases, but within tribunals. 1 I wish to add to the debate by sharing some thoughts on the matter ( §III) not before summarizing the split ( §II).
II. THE SPLIT
The Mexican fructose saga is important in many ways. Not only is it the most important investment arbitration case Mexico has been a party to, it is also part of a larger, sensitive and politically charged problem between parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). Hence, the arbitrations deriving therefrom are bound to produce important case law on international investment law and State responsibility.
Moreover, they promise to test the resolve with which NAFTA members are committed to the international Rule of Law.
Recently, two ICSID (Additional Facility) tribunals issued awards addressing inter alia the nature of investors' rights under investment treaties. Interestingly, while analyzing the same facts, legal claims and arguments, both tribunals came to opposite conclusions on one topic: the nature of the rights in question. To compound the difference, minority opinions existed on the same point.
Considering the outcome of both cases, three points of view are extant:
1. Investors' rights under investment treaties are merely procedural;
2. Investors' rights under investment treaties are substantive as well as procedural; and 1 All cases thus far made public displayed minority positions and separate opinions.
3.
Irrespective of how investors' rights are characterized, investor rights remain unaffected by countermeasures.
I shall summarize the rationale as posited in the cases to provide the reader a framework for comments to follow.
A. INVESTOR RIGHTS ARE MERELY PROCEDURAL
In wish to posit, is not to be found in the text, 25 but in the backdrop of international law and the consequences of each theory.
In both cases Mexico argued that the investor rights belonged to State parties. 26 In support of its proposition it cited arguments made in prior cases, including positions taken by other NAFTA parties. In one of the cases the argument prevailed; 27 in another it did not. 28
One must wonder, is there a difference? Accepting-as I am sure the reader will-that whatever A and B agreed to in the investment treaty will benefit or constrain C: A moment's pause on the premise is worth making.
One can make the point that for C to be able to sue A, C has to be the title-holder not only of a procedural, but also a substantive, right (the seed of the 'direct theory'). 29 In contrast, one could advance the notion that, more than a title-holder, C is given the (extraordinary but limited) right to step into the shoes of B and sue A when A fails to comply (the gist of the 'derivative theory'). 30 Finally, it could be argued that investors are only given a procedural right to claim responsibility from A for failing to observe a duty owed to B (the 'intermediate theory').
The discussion reminds this author of the (academically fascinating, but practically indifferent) debate surrounding the institution of stipulation pour autrui. 31 As the reader will recall, said instrument of contractual liberty has provoked (domestic law) theories galore.
Irrespective of the preference of the reader, I am sure she will agree that, from the standpoint of the beneficiary, the practical legal result is the same. Whatever promisee agreed vis-à-vis promisor will be the alpha and the omega of what the beneficiary may sue for. In a similar fashion, whatever agreement the State parties to an investment treaty came to, is the content and scope of the investor right. Nothing more. Nothing less. And recent cases bear dramatic testimony to the consequences of said principle. 32 With this in mind, one can now ask: which theory better fits the modern international investment regime? In answering this question, the reader is forewarned:
choosing the right theory is pivotal to the consequences. If the direct theory is preferred, arguably the 29 Put differently, investors vindicate their own rights under investment treaties as a result of a quasi-subrogation operated by the investment treaty which allows the investor to seek a remedy that would otherwise accrue in favor of the State.
30
More formally, and following The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case ((Greece v. Britain), P.C.I.J. Series B, No. 3, (1924) ), investors prosecuting a claim further to an investment treaty are merely acting as a proxy for the State with which they share nationality since said State is the true repository of the rights and obligations contained in the investment treaty.
31
'Estipulación a favor de tercero' in Spanish, which is similar to the common law's 'third-party rights' under contract law (albeit differences exist). right bestowed on investors would be insulated from the political vagaries between the states parties to the investment agreement. And by the same token, if the right benefitting the investor is deemed to be derivative, it would be subject to the status of the underlying relation: the treaty between A and B.
Which is preferable? Or to ask the question more appropriately: which is more consistent with the applicable law?
There is no obvious answer. One could argue for instance that preferring the direct theory furthers the goals of the discipline by insulating the treaty-protections from the dynamics of international politics. Alternatively, one could posit that, as a creature of treaty, believing that the benefits are somehow emancipated from their instrument of origin (the treaty) lacks coherence.
At this juncture, the reader would not be faulted for wondering whether the analysis is not Procrustean. 33 I wish to submit that the better view is that investment treaty rights are part and parcel of the treaty they stem from and hence subject to the legal vicissitudes the treaty may suffer. One said vicissitude may be countermeasures.
The foregoing position, when compared to the three theoretical pigeonholes described above ( §II, supra), appears to fall in the 'derivative theory' category thus situating me in the 'merely procedural' school of thought. However, I am unsure as to whether what I have in mind is adequately reflected by such characterization. I shall therefore elaborate.
Investor rights flowing from investment treaties are rooted in the treaties they stem from. The claim seems almost tautological. After all, absent the treaty, no such right exists under general international law. 34 If one of the States decides to denounce the
33
In Greek mythology, Procrustes is a giant thief who seizes travelers and ties them to an iron bed. He stretches them or cuts off their legs as needed to make them fit the bed. I use it to illustrate the (intellectually questionable) exercise of adjusting reality to fit the theory one wishes to advance.
34
The careful reader may suggest a caveat. While the assertion is unquestionable for certain rights (such as most-favored-nation treatment), it is arguable for others (such as minimum standard of treatment). I nonetheless leave it unqualified given that the right to a remedy for breach of the treaty enforceable through arbitration is wholly grounded in the treaty.
treaty, 35 one could hardly argue that investors' rights therefrom have indefinitely inured to the benefit of investors-even after the treaty has ceased to exist. 36 Arguing in favor of investors having rights that are completely insulated from the instrument they hail from is tantamount to such argument. Investor rights do not float in the international legal firmament; they are anchored in the investment treaties they stem from. Hence, it must be accepted that treaties are subject to a legal regime as to their existence, validity, compliance, and excuse of obligations. That regime is dual: treaty law 37 and State responsibility law, 38 both of which are nurtured from general international law.
Granted, this does not mean that treaties cannot be tailored to procure rights and duties unaffected by general international law (assuming that is what parties want).
International treaty law lends itself to such end. However, such outcome must be agreed to. It cannot be inferred gratuitously.
Admittedly, the conclusion may follow both from an express provision or an implied Admittedly, the assertion begs the ratione temporis question, which I shall not address.
(my emphasis)
As may be observed, NAFTA parties expressly agreed that international law applies. In and of itself, the proviso may be insufficient to convince hard core skeptics 39 -if it wasn't for the backdrop of State responsibility law, which bootstraps the argument.
Article 55 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility gives eco to the paradigm that international State responsibility law is lex generalis; it is subject to the lex specialis-in our case, NAFTA. The reason for said principle is easy to understand. States often regulate the legal consequences for breaches of the deals they are striking. Where they have done so, they will be deemed to have contracted against default customary international law, which would cease to apply. Admittedly, the proviso need not be express. It may be implied. However, even where a proviso exists, the conclusion cannot ipso facto be that State responsibility law is completely displaced. It may still apply residually (what is known as the 'weak' version of the lex specialis principle). So it is not enough that the subject matter be dealt with in the primary obligation; there must also be either an inconsistency between the contracted primary rule and the general international law rule.
How does the above come into play in our debate? The answer is one of interpretation. How lex specialis derogat legi generali impacts the conclusion is a question to be resolved in casu. And often the matter is arguable-as in our case. The interpreter seeking guidance could (and should) ask herself: is the treaty regime tailored to be selfcontained? If so, the strong version of lex specialis would apply: general international law is overridden in toto.
In our case, the answer is readily available: not only is NAFTA Chapter XI not self-contained, 40 but it expressly establishes the applicability of international law. Therefore, the school of thought that wishes to emancipate investor rights faces, at least in 39 After all, as an instrument of international law, treaties are always governed by such.
40
A premise easily observed by the fact that Chapter XI does not provide consequences for breach of the obligations other than simply routes to follow to seek enforcement (NAFTA Article 1136).
'Secondary rule' -type consequences (such as countermeasures) are not addressed in NAFTA Chapter XI. the case of NAFTA, a textual Achilles Heel: the NAFTA parties expressly agreed to have general international law apply-which includes countermeasures.
The rudimentary instrument of countermeasures is to be found in the toolbox of general international law. Countermeasures are a self-help mechanism extant in the decentralized system of international law. As such, when certain requirements are met, they may be used to inflict an unwelcome cost upon counterparties allegedly delinquent in their respective obligations. The source of said obligations may or may not be a treaty.
And there is nothing in investment treaties that inherently changes this. If one wishes to find authority against its availability, it must come from the compact itself.
Agnostics point to the fact that NAFTA includes a promise to provide investors "due process before an impartial tribunal". 41 The leitmotif of said instrument -nay, the discipline as a whole-is to remove investment disputes from the political realm by putting disputing parties on a more equal footing, placing them in the realm of commercial arbitration. 42 The argument-albeit true-misses the point. Granted, a law-based system is much better to the international no-mans land that would counterfactually prevail. But legal instruments have a legal regime. And within said legal regime one finds all sorts of (valid) legal reasons to -for instance-excuse non-compliance, or exempt liability therefrom. In the private realm, such regime is the province of contract law. In the international sphere, it is the law of treaties and law of State responsibility. Prominent amongst the latter is the regime of countermeasures. Whether we like it or not, absent contrary provision, investment treaties are governed by said regime. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Judgment), para 47.
"…A determination of whether a convention is or is not in force, and whether it has or has not been properly suspended or denounced, is to be made pursuant to the law of treaties. On the other hand, an evaluation of the extent to which the suspension or denunciation of a convention, seen as incompatible with the law of treaties, involves the responsibility of the State which proceeded to it, is to be made under the law of State responsibility."
The contrary position, in advancing what seems to be a lofty goal, loses sight of the origins of the rights. Hailing from international lex scripta, it is hard to deny that they are subject to its legal health. To the treaty's regime, which is nurtured by general international law, to which I now turn to.
B. GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
In addition to the lex scripta angle, a general international law one is worth examining.
A question begged by the debate at hand is whether investment treaties implicitly displace the general international law rules involving excuse of obligations. The citation is apposite in that the defense evoked, albeit different than the one we have been focusing on (countermeasures), also stems from customary international law. I wish to advance two reasons against the proposition: (1) it is contrary to the international law on State responsibility; and (2) it is inconvenient.
Proper place in State responsibility law
Obligations under investment treaties are, in the argot of international law of State responsibility, "primary rules". 47 Their breach triggers the application of "secondary rules", which govern the consequences of the breach of the primary obligation. Within said (fascinating) corpus of international law one finds the topic of countermeasures. In a nutshell, absent cessation or reparation, the injured state may take refuge in countermeasures 48 (provided their regime is complied with 49 ).
The relation between treaty law and international law on this topic is precisely that, in presence of an international delict, rules of responsibility apply. And said rules provide excuses in certain cases.
The regime is not only rich but worth having. 50 Not only does it provide a juridical -in contrast to a political or forceful-response to an international unlawful act, if properly followed, it always seeks to induce compliance. It is 'instrumental': it always seeks to incent compliance and reduce the likelihood of strategic or reproachable behavior. 51
The theory is inconvenient
Arguing that rights under investment treaties are insulated from customary international law is not only (legally) inapposite, but suboptimal and inconvenient. Suboptimal in that current customary international law includes a robust regime worth having in lieu of doing without. Inconvenient because, absent the regime, nefarious conduct would ensue.
47
Needless to say, they are not the only primary rules. They are the source of the obligations in question.
48
Article 22 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
49
As exemplified by articles 49 to 55 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
50
It is nurtured by timeless experience and hundreds of cases. Absent the countermeasure regime, the probable result would not be absence measures against investors and their investments; but a legal-vacuum against which to adjudge measures that will in all likelihood take place. Assuming that States will not take measures when deemed convenient is simply contrary to experience. When faced with a crisis, States will respond. Believing otherwise not only overlooks experience, but is innocent. Thence, it is much better to have a regime in place which counterbalances the exercise of measures taken when another State breaches an international obligation, than having none; particularly because of the inherent tendency to become abusive or excessive. 52 With this in mind the reader can see why arguing in favor of excluding investor rights from countermeasures is counterproductive to the goal of protecting investments as much as possible. It amounts to one of those (ironic) instances where the goal sought is hurt by precisely the theory evinced in its favor. 
C. OTHER ASPECTS
Our debate merits two additional comments from the standpoint of the history of the discipline and current events.
Place in the paradigm flux
An argument I have not seen anyone make but may be worth tackling is how this characterization debate should be affected by the (fledgling yet interesting) refinement of international law as to standing of private persons. 53 As the reader knows, the traditional positivist thought in international law establishes a dichotomy between objects and subjects of international law. Under this paradigm, only States and international organizations are subjects, whereas individuals are (were) deemed 'things' -objects-of international law.
A challenge to said view is gradually mushrooming. Some believe a better way to characterize the role of private persons (natural and juridical) is to consider them 'participants' in the international legal order. 54 This conceptual refinement is the product of the empirical development of private persons having international standing under human rights and investment treaties. This is not the place to expand on the topic. The relevance of the theory in our debate is that advocates of the direct rights theory may quote said development to muster support in favor of the view they wish to advance. And the line of argument would not be hard to imagine: recognizing investors substantive rights would be consonant to the (gradually emerging -and exciting, I might add-) theory that private persons have a place in the international legal order. Hence, characterizing said investor rights as anything less than substantive (eg., 'merely procedural' or 'derivative') is a step in the wrong direction. It runs counter to the current flux of the paradigm, which many believe to be plausible.
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CPI v Mexico (para 170) touches upon the topic. However, it does not frame it as done in here. It rather uses it as a premise of the conclusion I have summarized in section II.B, supra. The point deserves careful examination. After all, the development is praiseworthy.
I query whether these are competing lines of thought. Is it really contradictory to argue that (i) investor rights are -absent contrary stipulation in the treaty in questionsubject to the general international law regime applicable to the treaty they derive from;
and (ii) that private persons deserve a place in the 'international legal order'? After all, the 'place', the 'room' Volterra eloquently refers to, 55 is a product of States giving private persons said space. 56 And they do so through treaties-which are themselves governed by international law. This last strand of the argument deserves emphasis. One may agree with the refinement of the paradigm and, at the same time, in the same breath-without concomitantly blowing hot and cold-believe that the legal status of the said rights is governed by general international law. Why not?
The contradiction, in my opinion, is more apparent than real.
Countering a regrettable fiction
A final point merits attention. It has been argued that a reason to construe investor rights as substantive is to be found in the historic problem surrounding diplomatic protection.
The CPI v Mexico award made the interesting argument that: 57 It has long been the case that international lawyers have treated as a fiction the notion that in diplomatic protection cases the State was asserting a right of its ownviolated because an injury done to its national was in fact an injury to the State itself. It was a necessary fiction, because procedurally only a State could bring an international claim, but the fact that it did not reflect substantive reality showed through not only in the juristic writing but also in various rules of law surrounding diplomatic protection claims. In wish to share some thoughts involving said point in the context of our debate.
True, international law has fabricated a fiction when it comes to injury to aliens: said injury is also deemed an injury to the State of nationality itself (the reputed Vattelian formula). But does the premise conclusively support the substantive rights conclusion?
The CPI v Mexico Tribunal thinks so:
"What these two rules [ 62 ] actually demonstrate is that when a State claimed for a wrong done to its national it was in reality acting on behalf of that national, rather than asserting a right of its own. …" 63
The point is driven home in para 174:
"…there is no need to continue that fiction in a case in which the individual is vested with a right to bring claims of its own. …It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by restoring to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights -its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. … Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is sole claimant.
So, if the right exercised is different than the right espoused (the national's right), how does this conclusively support the view that investors have to own a substantive treaty right to be able to claim?
Perhaps the answer is that the conclusion does not necessarily follow. States have an international law right to espouse claims stemming from injuries to nationals, and
States may contractually (through investment treaties) confer rights to nationals to sue, which right -absent contrary proviso-will be subject to the vicissitudes of the treaty it grows from. We are dealing with two substantively different rights. They need not blend.
And they need not displace each other.
IV. FINAL COMMENT
The Mexican fructose saga has instilled many lessons in those of us dedicated to investment arbitration. One is that, not only can reasonable minds differ, but brilliant minds too. The illuminati sitting in these tribunals bear testimony to said truth. The awards in comment were drafted by members of the crème de la crème of international, investment and arbitration law. The outcome has been as fascinating as it has been controversial.
